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INTRODUCTION  
"If we lose freedom here [in America], there is no place to escape to.    
 This is the last stand on Earth." 
- President Ronald Reagan, October 27, 19841 
The term “perimeter defense” has come back into vogue recently, with regard to security 
strategies for North America. The United States’ concern with the terrorist threat to its 
homeland subsequent to September 11th, 2001, is generating this discussion with its 
immediate neighbors of Mexico and Canada (and to some extent some Caribbean 
nations – the “third border”). The concept is simply that by pushing defenses out to the 
“perimeter” nations, United States security will be enhanced, since the United States 
visions itself as more vulnerable to international terrorism than Mexico or Canada. 
This paper examines the concept of “perimeter defense” within the context of the 
security challenges the United States, Mexico, and Canada, face today. The focus will 
primarily be on U.S. perspectives and threat perception in a post 9/11 security 
environment. Questions to be addressed in the paper include: Do all these nations share 
the same “threat” perception? Where exactly is the “perimeter?” What security 
arrangements have been tried in the past? What are the prospects for the future for 
increased security cooperation? Sources for analysis include a review of historical 
precedents for security agreements in the Americas (to include an overview of the 
Defense Ministerial of the Americas process on cooperative security measures 
throughout the region); however the main focus is at the sub-regional level in North 
America and multilateral and bilateral security approaches between the United States, 
Canada, and Mexico.   
Historical Background on Mexico, Canada, and U.S. Security Cooperation 
In 1942, the United States was engaged in its largest military commitment to date – 
World War II – with combat operations occurring in multiple theaters of operation, 
from Europe, to North Africa, to the Pacific. The threat was from the Axis imperialist 
powers of Germany, Italy, and Japan, seeking to expand their empires and spheres of 
influence through military conquest. The Allies were all those nations united against the 
German-Italian-Japanese alliance, who took an active part in defeating, or at least 
opposing, the Axis advance throughout Europe, Asia, Africa, and even the Americas. 
What allowed the United States the security and freedom of action to commit such 
large military forces to two major theaters of operations, simultaneously, was the 
providence of history, geography, and politics that provided safe borders to its north and 
south and the lack of an internal threat that would have required a large home-
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stationing of combat-ready forces committed to the internal defense of the nation. Due 
to the technology available at the time and the limited ability of an already stretched 
adversary to create a third operational theater in the Americas, the United States, 
Canada, and Mexico were spared from the conflict internally, yet all three countries 
contributed military forces to fight their mutual adversaries “over there.” 
As early as June 1940, Mexican President Lazaro Cárdenas sent word to Washington, 
advising President Roosevelt that Mexico stood ready to take its position alongside other 
nations of Latin America, "that in the event of any act of aggression against the 
American continent which brought the United States into war, the U.S. could count on 
full military and naval cooperation from Mexico in addition to the use of Mexican 
territory and Mexican national bases for American forces."2 It is of interest to note that 
Cárdenas went as far as to express a willingness to join in a military alliance with the 
United States. For Roosevelt, this was vindication of the success of the Good Neighbor 
Policy, implemented in 1932, which sought to change the fundamental nature of U.S.-
Latin American relations, in general, and security relationships in particular.3  
The early war years brought the United States and Mexico together in a number of 
ways which influenced the security of the two nations. The political costs to Mexico, 
however, were always an issue. As John Childs notes,   
For Mexico, there were economic, political, and military dangers in too long a 
sustained intimate relationship with the U.S., and there was a special sensitivity 
to the issue of U.S. troops on Mexican soil.  The Mexican-U.S. bilateral 
relationship was thus characterized in World War II by an extra-ordinary delicacy 
in which every military decision was fraught with political implications.  
Negotiations, joint planning, and even discussion were protracted, sensitive, and 
almost unnatural in contrast with the easier Brazilian-U.S. military relationship.4  
In terms of joint military cooperation within Latin America, the wartime relations 
between the U.S. and Mexican militaries were second only to Brazil.5 The formation of 
the Joint Mexican-U.S. Defense Commission (JMUSDC) in 1942, the April 1941 Treaty 
of Reciprocal Military Transit Rights, Mexican participation in the Inter-American 
Defense Board, lend-lease, and a number of other bilateral agreements for radar 
installations and use of air fields testified to the increased contact and cooperation 
between the Mexican and U.S. militaries on security issues in light of a common threat. 
     However, sensitivities remained on just how close the security alliance could be, 
given Mexican nationalist sensitivities. For example, the Mexican government 
demanded that all U.S. military personnel serving in Mexico be under the command of 
Mexican officers. The Mexicans were also sensitive to the mere appearance of U.S. 
troops in Mexico, requiring Army Air Corps personnel utilizing Mexican air fields to 
wear Pan American airline uniforms. Through lend-lease, the Mexican military gained 
over $50 million in military supplies, mostly small caliber weapons and ordnance. They 
also received training and educational assistance, both in the United States and Mexico. 
While Mexico would not accept a U.S. military mission, military technical experts were 
allowed to man radar sites and airfields, training Mexican nationals to operate much of 
the equipment themselves.6  
     Direct Mexican participation in the war was initially outlawed by President Avila 
Camacho in February 1943; however, in July 1943, Foreign Secretary Padilla and U.S. 
Ambassador Messersmith began discussions over the involvement of a Mexican air unit 
in combat operations. The subject was not brought up at the JMUSDC until September 
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1943 by General Cárdenas, who was now serving as Secretary of National Defense in 
Mexico.7 Although the Mexican military may have supported a more active role in the 
war effort much earlier, it is evident that in terms of policy-making, the military had to 
defer to the national government before proceeding with actual negotiations. 
     Cárdenas supported Mexican efforts to participate militarily in World War II in at 
least two significant ways. In June 1944, a combat aviation squadron traveled to the 
United States for training. In April 1945, Escuadrón de Pelea 201 of the Mexican 
Expeditionary Air Force arrived at Clark Air Force Base in the Philippines, armed with 
twenty-five Republic P-47 Thunderbolts. Thirty-two Mexican pilots flew over 700 
combat missions in the Pacific theater, suffering seven casualties.8 Also, based on a 
January 1942 agreement, 250,000 Mexican nationals living in the United States were 
inducted into the U.S. military.  Approximately 14,000 saw combat, suffering over 1,000 
casualties.9  
     The impact of World War II on the Mexican military was significant, not so much for 
what was accomplished, but rather for what was not. Although the doors were opened 
for increased dialogue between the United States and Mexico on security issues, they 
were not creating a funnel, channeling a large amount of resources and influence south 
of the border. While the rise of U.S. military power over the European powers created a 
significant change in influence over the Brazilian military after World War II, no such 
transformation occurred in Mexico. The influence of French, German, or other 
European militaries had always been marginal in Mexico and historical relations 
between Mexico and the United States dictated that U.S. influence remain checked.  
Mexico's refusal to accept a U.S. military mission characterized the desire of the nation's 
political leaders to prevent the Mexican military from becoming an independent actor in 
the future, tied to foreign influence. The Mexican military needed to remain subordinate 
to the regime and tied to the institutional goals of the Mexican Revolution, for which a 
strong sense of nationalism and xenophobia were important. 
With regard to Canada’s security relationship with the United States during World 
War II, the two nations already had significant military ties, having fought together in 
World War I and having shared security cooperation from intelligence agreements with 
the “five-eyes” English-speaking countries to military training and schooling 
exchanges.10 The United States and Canadian militaries shared similar doctrine and 
tactics, military equipment, and schooling, having both emerged from the British 
military-school model. With regard to security cooperation, sharing a common 
language, as well as a common lexicon and cultural heritage, made the relationship 
between the two nations much more “natural” than the often strained relationship 
between the United States and Mexico.11 
Prior to WWII, the United States and Canada formed a bilateral security relationship 
in 1940, through the Ogdensburg Declaration with the formation of the Permanent Joint 
Board of Defense (PJBD). Through the PJBD, U.S and Canadian senior military officials 
co-chair the Board, offering advice to both the Prime Minister and the President on “the 
defence of the northern half of the Northern Hemisphere.”12  
Following WWII, the United and Canada also entered into a number of multilateral 
and bilateral security relationships. The most comprehensive security agreements 
between the two countries began with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in 
1949, further solidifying their mutual security relationship in light of the post-WWII 
threat of Soviet communism. Canada and the United States expanded security 
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cooperation in 1958 through the formation of the North American Air Defense 
Command (NORAD), providing for the territorial defense of the Northern Hemisphere 
from ballistic missiles and other air-borne threats to both nations. Today, Canada and 
the United States are party to “over 80 treaty-level defence agreements, more than 250 
memoranda of understanding between the two defence departments, and approximately 
145 bilateral forums in which defence matters are discussed.”13  
While Mexico and the United States came together following WWII to participate in 
the formation of the Rio Treaty of 1947 (Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal 
Assistance), Canada did not participate and has never been a signatory to this 
agreement. In fact, Canada did not join the Organization of American States (formed in 
1948) until 1989, nor did it join the Inter-American Defense Board (formed in 1942) 
until 2002. Therefore, while there has been precedence for a number of bilateral 
security agreements between the United States and Mexico and the United States and 
Canada, there is little historical precedence for regional security cooperation between all 
three nations. 
The Defense Ministerial Process 
In December 1994, the United States hosted the First Summit of the Americas in Miami, 
Florida.  This was the first gathering of heads of state in the hemisphere since the Punta 
del Este Conference in Uruguay in 1967. The goal was to take advantage of the 
significant political changes that had occurred throughout the hemisphere with 
expansion of democratic governments and transition away form authoritarian regimes. 
It also sought to further expand economic cooperation through the formation of a Free 
Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) by January 2005, expanding on the initial successes 
of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) between Canada, the United 
States, and Mexico, which had gone into effect in January 2004. 
The U.S. Secretary of Defense, William Perry, suggested that what was missing in the 
broadening political and economic relationships between nations in the region was the 
“third leg” of the stool: increased security cooperation. To this end, Secretary Perry 
proposed a meeting of secretaries and ministers of defense from all thirty-four 
democratic nations in the hemisphere to continue the “Spirit of Miami” by joining in a 
Defense Ministerial of the Americas (DMA). Perry intended the DMA to offer a structure 
to discuss means to enhance security relationships that would reinforce the expanding 
political and economic ties that were occurring in the region. The first DMA occurred in 
Williamsburg, VA in June 1995. There have been six subsequent meetings (Argentina 
1996, Colombia 1998, Brazil 2000, Chile 2002, Ecuador 2004, Nicaragua 2006). The 
next meeting is scheduled for Canada in 2008. At the first DMA, Mexico did not 
officially attend, citing Mexico’s long-standing policy of avoiding any appearance of 
participating in a formal military alliance with the United States or other nations in the 
region. Instead, Mexico sent Ambassador Silva Herzog and his defense attaché in an 
“observer” status.14 
The DMA process established a biennial mechanism for routine meetings between 
defense ministers throughout Latin America. It also fostered discussions on topics 
ranging from commitments to fight environmental disasters, to fighting narco-
terrorism. While specific agreements and programs were often missing, what was 
occurring was a cultural shift in many Latin American military institutions, recognizing 
that a key democratic principle being invoked by the United States was military 
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subordination to civilian authority. It was not enough that all nations participating in 
the DMA had democratically-elected heads of state. The United States was also 
promoting the notion that civilian control should go much further and include civilian 
heads of the Ministries of Defense.15 This idea was solidified by the formation of the 
Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies (CHDS), under the National Defense University 
in Washington, D.C. The CHDS actively promoted the process of “civilianizing” 
Ministries of Defense by offering courses designed to develop Latin American civilian 
defense workers by educating them on defense planning, programming, and budgeting 
issues.16  
The DMA process was successful in this regard in “converting” Latin American 
militaries to the U.S. model with one civilian minister (or secretary) of defense 
overseeing the individual armed services. By the time the fourth DMA occurred, all 
Latin American countries, except Mexico, had a minister of defense (or equivalent), and 
all but six were civilian.17 By the time of the fifth DMA, Mexico continued to be the lone 
stand-out, maintaining its separate cabinet-level military organizations, with the 
military officer-run secretary of defense and secretary of the navy directly falling under 
the president, rather than a civilian minister of defense. For this reason, Mexico’s 
participation in the DMA process has been limited to symbolic gestures or behind-the-
scene bilateral discussions, yet no official proclamations of support for broader 
hemispheric security cooperation through strictly military organizations. Rather Mexico 
has chosen to pursue discussions on regional security cooperation through other 
established venues, such as the OAS Conference on Hemispheric Security or through its 
military advisory component of the Inter-American Defense Board. 
The DMA process continues to foster a commitment to the broad goals and objectives 
of hemispheric security cooperation originally envisioned by Secretary of Defense 
William Perry in 1995. However, it has failed to establish the institutional structures of a 
NATO-like security organization with all nations in the region equally committed to the 
same concepts of “security.” Ironically, Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld’s opening 
comments at the fifth DMA in Chile in 2002 came immediately before his departure for 
Prague and participation in the NATO summit. Rumsfeld noted similarities between the 
processes both NATO and the DMA faced: “consolidate the democratic progress of the 
region; set military priorities in our democratic societies; identify the new threats of the 
21st century; and transform our capabilities to meet those emerging threats.”18  
However, that is where similarities ended. While NATO created a formidable military 
alliance, credited with maintaining peace and stability in Europe throughout the Cold 
War, the DMA has produced no such equivalent security agreement in the Americas.   
For the United States, Mexico, and Canada, security relationships throughout the 
previous century have remained primarily bilateral relationships, either between the 
United States and Mexico, or between the United States and Canada. NATO further 
provided a structure whereby the United States and Canada operationalized military 
doctrine, tactics, and equipment through a number of Standardization Agreements 
(STANAGs), as well through training and exercises. This relationship, forged in combat, 
has grown through further military cooperation in places like Bosnia, Kosovo, and most 
recently in Afghanistan. Canada and Mexico have only recently come together on the 
“perimeter” of security discussions, primarily through the formation of the NAFTA in 
1994 and their growing economic interdependence with the United States. It was only 
through the tragic events of September 11, 2001 that these three nations would be 
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transformed by the new security challenges of global terrorism and realize that their 
futures – politically, economically, and physically – were indelibly linked by this new 
reality, since an attack on the economic infrastructure of the United States would have 
significant repercussions throughout the Northern Hemisphere.19 
 
THE POST 9-11 SECURITY ENVIRONMENT 
"To defend this nation, we have to defend as far out as possible. Therefore we need the support of 
Canada and Mexico to be able to defend our interests." 
- General Ralph "Ed" Eberhart, USAF Former Commander, U.S. Northern Command20  
 
The terrorist attacks on the United States on September 11, 2001 occurred on the same 
day that foreign ministers from throughout Latin America were meeting in Lima, Peru 
to sign the Inter-American Democratic Charter. This OAS-sponsored event was 
precipitated by the “undemocratic” practices of former Peruvian President Alberto 
Fujimori and his usurping constitutional procedures to maintain himself in office, as 
well as a recent military coup in Ecuador to overthrow a democratically-elected leader. 
The goals of the September meeting were therefore to gain a commitment from the 
nations throughout the hemisphere to support continued democratic governance and to 
work together to put pressure on regimes that seek to undermine these principles.21 On 
that day, the “threat” to democracy in the region was not international terrorism. 
Since September 11th, the United States has reshaped its security strategy and 
institutional structures in order to respond to the new threat of international terrorism 
specifically targeted against U.S. interests at home and abroad. This fundamental shift 
in U.S. policy directly impacted U.S. security relations with nations around the globe, 
primarily with regard to what has been referred to a “preemptive” military action in 
Afghanistan and Iraq. While many nations echoed support for U.S. and Coalition forces’ 
action in Afghanistan, specifically targeted against the Taliban regime and known 
terrorist bases in that county, they did not join in U.S. efforts against Saddam Hussein 
and military action in Iraq. In fact, two nations in Latin America, Mexico and Chile, both 
Security Council members at that time, voted against U.S.-sponsored action in the 
United Nations seeking an international sanction for military action. Even Canada, a 
staunch Cold War ally, refused to support U.S. military action in Iraq, instead, limiting 
its military support for the Global War on Terrorism to Coalition actions in Afghanistan. 
While the Canadian and Mexican governments took public stands against the United 
States on Iraq, behind the scenes both countries were moving forward in 
accommodating the United States’ new view of the threat of terrorism in the Northern 
Hemisphere. On the military side, both Canada and Mexico began to take on new 
security relationships with their U.S. counterparts, even challenging some old taboos. 
For example, after September 11th, the United States military stood up a new command 
to specifically support the Homeland Defense role of the military in support of 
Homeland Security.22 U.S. Northern Command (NORTHCOM) was carved out of the 
existing U.S. Space Command structure, located at Peterson AFB, Colorado Springs, CO, 
which also housed the North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD). The 
first NORTHCOM Commander, Air Force General Ralph “Ed” Eberhart, took off his U.S 
Space Command hat one day and put on his U.S. Northern Command hat that same day. 
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He never relinquished his NORAD hat in the process. Canada continued to provide 
personnel to NORAD even as the new U.S. command group stood up the NORTHCOM 
structure, with its focus on supporting the U.S. government’s new Homeland Security 
organizational structure. Defense planners in the Pentagon were also considering 
overtures to Mexico, based on the new Unified Command Plan architecture that 
“placed” Mexico and Canada both under the operational area of responsibility (AOR) 
overview of the NORTHCOM Commander.23 In the past, Mexico opposed any efforts by 
the Department of Defense to “assign” their nation to any U.S. military organization. In 
fact the Mexican secretary of defense (an Army general officer) traditionally preferred to 
work all U.S.-Mexican “army” contacts directly through the U.S. Army chief of staff, who 
was a uniformed officer, rather than the civilian U.S. secretary of defense. Yet, with the 
formation of NORTHCOM, Mexico’s secretary of defense at the time, General Clemente 
Vega, initially indicated a willingness to open channels of communication to this new 
command structure and not be constrained by past relationships.24 
On the political side, there were also changes in Mexico with regard to that nation’s 
view toward security and relations with the United States. Prior to September 11th, 
Mexico appeared to be moving in the direction of recommending that the Inter-
American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (Rio Treaty of 1947) and the Inter-American 
Defense Board be revoked in their entirety since these structures lacked validity due to 
the fundamental change in the security relationships between nations in the 
hemisphere.25 Yet, after September 11th, Mexican President Vicente Fox took the 
complete opposite position, citing the need for a “second Chapultepec Conference” in 
Mexico City in 2003, to discuss hemispheric security issues. Although he was careful not 
to allude to the formation of any new formal military alliances and insisted that the real 
“threat” to the hemisphere was still poverty, Fox was clearly falling more in line with 
U.S. interests and desires to expand the security relationship in the Northern 
Hemisphere. 
Canada and the United States are making significant progress in the realignment of 
their security relationships. In December 2002, the Bi-national Planning Group (BPG) 
was stood up, after exchanging formal diplomatic notes and terms of reference through 
diplomatic (secretary of state and ministry of foreign affairs) channels. The BPG has an 
ambitious agenda, seeking to expand the current NORAD agreement to include 
maritime and land-based approaches to the Northern Hemisphere. Other topics to be 
addressed include enhanced intelligence and information sharing, inter-agency 
cooperation, better situational awareness, and border security. The BPG completed their 
preliminary recommendations in 2005 and a renewed NORAD agreement, to include a 
maritime component, was signed in August 2006. 
On the U.S.-Mexico side of security cooperation, progress has been much slower. 
After Mexico’s initial show of support for U.S. security concerns after September 11th, 
2001, political reality set in, with a retrenchment of Mexican nationalism and public 
concern over Mexico’s involvement in any new formal military alliances. The Mexican 
press ran a number of articles condemning the formation of the new U.S. Northern 
Command in 2002 and the “assigning” of Mexico to its AOR, arguing that Mexico would 
soon be “occupied” by the U.S. military. Secretary of Defense Vega also came out with 
public comments condemning U.S. actions, insisting that the Mexican military would 
not be subordinated to such a new regional security system. He was adamant that he 
would not work through a U.S. regional combatant commander, insisting that his 
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relationship with the U.S. military would still be directly with the secretary of defense 
(whom he considered his equivalent cabinet-level officer) or the chief of staff of the 
Army.26 
On the political side, there were additional obstacles in furthering U.S.-Mexican 
security cooperation. The State Department, still reeling over Mexico’s failure to back 
the United States in the U.N. Security Council vote to authorize force in Iraq, continued 
to play hard-ball with the Mexican Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The State Department 
also blocked the Department of Defense’s desire to increase its Foreign Military 
Financing Program (FMFP) budget for Mexico to $57 million in FY05, reducing it to a 
meager $2.4 million. Although the Mexican military has traditionally shunned Foreign 
Military Sales (FMS) programs with the United States using FMFP credit (preferring 
instead to purchase any weapons systems or military equipment from Direct 
Commercial Sales, thus avoiding the “logistics tail” of being tied directly to the U.S. 
government for support) DoD still saw the symbolic significance of expanding FMFP 
money to Mexico as a “regional partner” in the Homeland Defense mission.27 Mexico 
received $11 million in FMFP funds in FY06.28 
Within the Department of Defense itself, there were additional impediments to an 
expanded U.S.-Mexico security relationship through the NORTHCOM structure. The 
Pentagon office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (DASD) for Western 
Hemispheric Affairs traditionally served as the conduit for U.S.-Mexico defense 
relationships since Mexico had been “unassigned” with regard to a Combatant 
Command’s Area of Responsibility (AOR). Although U.S. Southern Command had made 
overtures to change the UCP and place Mexico under its AOR, the DASD’s office balked 
at placing Mexico under any combatant commander.29 With a change in leadership in 
the office, under the new DASD Stephen Johnson it appears that opposition has waned.   
For U.S. Northern Command and NORAD officials seeking to accomplish their 
assigned mission of providing for the homeland defense of the continental United States 
and Canada, the prospect of expanding the “perimeter” of defense beyond the borders of 
these two nations, to include Mexico, continues to be problematic. Overtures continue to 
be made to Mexican defense officials through low-level contacts, or through established 
working relationships, such as Fifth U.S. Army-sponsored Border Commanders 
Conferences; however, the prospects of an expanded security relationship that would 
bring Mexico into either the current NORAD structure or the proposed expanded 
NORAD agreements is not likely to occur any time soon.30 
DEFINING THE THREAT AND THE PERIMETER 
If the United States, Canada, and Mexico are to form a new security relationship in the 
North American Hemisphere, given the large number of impediments previously 
discussed, another approach may be necessary. In other words, it may be worthwhile to 
readdress the security concerns of each nation, in a post September 11th world, by 
reexamining the nature of the “threat” that each nation perceives and the context of 
“perimeter” with regard to the security concerns of each. 
For the United States, the “threat” of global terrorism, primarily from fundamentalist 
Islamic groups, is very high.  The U.S. State Department current lists forty-two Foreign 
Terrorist Organizations (FTO), of which twenty-nine are Islamic groups.31  Some of 
these groups (Hezbollah, Hamas, etc.) are know to operate in Latin America, but other 
than Hezbollah’s implication in an attack on the Israeli Embassy in Argentina in 1992, 
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they have not actively targeted Latin American or U.S. interests in the region, to include 
Canada.32 Some terrorist groups, such as the Irish Republican Army, have been 
identified operating in Colombia with the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia 
(FARC), possibly providing demolitions training. But again, there is no evidence of any 
of these identified FTOs specifically targeting U.S. interests in the region. 
The United States still considers illegal drugs a “threat;” however, it would be difficult 
to say the country continues to fight a “war” on drugs. In Latin America, primarily 
Colombia, U.S. policy under the Bush Administration has shifted, allowing the United 
States to help fund counterterrorism as well as counter-narcotics efforts of the 
Colombian military and the National Police. In the month of October 2004, the United 
States further increased the number of military and contractors authorized to operate in 
Colombia to 1,600 (800 each). The link between narcotics trafficking and terrorists 
groups such as the FARC is documented and the U.S. Office of National Drug Control 
Policy (ONDCP) has made a number of public service announcements reinforcing the 
connection between drug trafficking and terrorism. ONDCP also notes that Mexico is 
still the major transit zone for cocaine entering the United States, approximately 70 per 
cent coming over the land bridge, as opposed to air, or maritime routes.33 
For Mexico, the “threat” is not terrorism, but rather Mexico’s internal political and 
economic situation. Mexican President Felipe Calderon realizes that Mexico faces 
increased instability due to the growing power of drug cartels and political violence if 
economic hardship were to escalate and the “pressure value” of the U.S. border were to 
be closed off over U.S. fears of illegal immigration and terrorists crossing the border. If 
the United States were to attempt to close the border, the impact on both nations’ 
economies would be enormous, primarily in Mexico, which has seen its trade with the 
United States grow exponentially in the last ten years under NAFTA (est. of $174 billion 
annually). The economic impact on Mexico would also be staggering should the United 
States attempt to limit the amount of foreign remittances sent to Mexico from Mexicans 
working in the United States (an estimated $16 billion annually, second only to oil as 
Mexico’s major export-earning commodity.)34 Viewed in this light, Mexico “can’t afford” 
another terrorist attack on the United States, particularly if it appears that the terrorists 
used Mexico as their route into the United States. 
For Canada, the “threat” of a loss of sovereignty to the United States appears to be the 
greatest stumbling block to increased security cooperation.  Under Prime Minister Jean 
Chrétien, Canada refused to support the United States and the War in Iraq. Under 
Prime Minister Paul Martin, Canada further refused to support the American National 
Missile Defense plan.  Conservative Party Prime Minister Stephen Harper (elected in 
2006) has attempted to draw Canada closer to the United States on security cooperation 
and undo some of the hostility encountered during the previous administrations, such 
as supporting Canada’s involvement in the Security and Prosperity Partnership (SPP). 
The SPP, signed in Waco, TX in 2005, is viewed skeptically by Canadians and 
Americans; both believe it is a cover for ushering in a North American Union (NAU) 
under a shroud of secrecy.35 Ironically, Canadians view involvement in the SPP as a loss 
of sovereignty to the United States, while American citizens view it as a loss of 
sovereignty to Mexico.36 
The three countries have witnessed an increase in security cooperation in two areas: 
the “threats” of natural disasters and pandemic influenza. After Hurricanes Katrina and 
Rita in September 2005, both the Canadian and Mexican militaries sent uniformed 
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personnel to the United States to aid in disaster relief. For Mexico, the sight of Army 
convoys, traveling north across the U.S.- Mexican border signaled a new era of security 
relations with the United States and a new role for the Mexican military, operating 
outside its borders.37 For Canada, it was a routine deployment, providing humanitarian 
assistance – this time to its southern neighbor.38 In September 2007, the U.S. Northern 
Command hosted a conference on pandemic influenza, which brought together public 
health, military, and government officials from the United States, Canada, and Mexico 
to discuss cross-border cooperation in the event that such a pandemic should occur.39 
The fact is that many border towns (such as the communities of Laredo, Texas and 
Nuevo Laredo, Mexico) have already established linkages and have begun to plan for 
pandemic flu-related events. 
 
THE ROAD AHEAD 
"The values and principles we share, in particular democracy, the rule of law and respect for individual 
rights and freedoms, underpin our efforts in building a more prosperous and secure region. 
    - Joint Statement by President George W. Bush, Prime Minster Stephen Harper, 
and President Felipe Calderón, Montebello, Canada, August 21,  200740  
Perimeter defense and regional security cooperation will remain a key component of the 
trilateral relationship between Canada, Mexico, and the United States for many years to 
come. Even with changes in government in each country, successors have been quick to 
embrace the process of dialog and cooperation, regardless of party affiliation or 
domestic political agendas. The stakes are too high not to do so. A catastrophic terrorist 
incident at the border, pandemic flu, or even a major natural disaster is not an isolated 
event which impacts only one nation. Each poses a series of challenges to the region as a 
whole and recognition that the growing interdependence between countries (which is 
still primarily economic) has created a security dimension of its own, whereby a threat 
to any one of the three countries has to be considered a threat to all three. 
Yet, there remain significant hurdles to developing a broader sense of security 
cooperation, the most pressing being immigration. Most Americans are opposed to open 
borders, with over 70 percent in favor of building a fence and increasing border 
security.41 Nor do they want a “North American Union” or merger with Canada and 
Mexico, along the lines of the European Union’s emergence at the expense of national 
sovereignty. Cultural affinity and nationalism run deep in all three countries and any 
proposed security agreements which imply a loss of national identity or sovereignty will 
not pass muster.   
The most successful security agreements have been those shaped by shared threat 
perceptions and the imminence of attack. The more distant the adversary, the less likely 
the “home team” is willing to play. Perimeter defense implies that the threat remains 
“out there” and there is a need to keep it from coming “in here.” Clearly, the focus on 
homeland security and homeland defense in the War on Terrorism conveys this point of 
view. However, by taking an “all-hazards” approach to homeland security and including 
the threats from both man-made and natural disasters in the equation, the concept of 
perimeter defense takes on an internal dimension as well as an external focus. In other 
words, the threats that Canada, Mexico, and the United States face, now and in the 
future, are of such significance to economic security and domestic policy considerations 
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that the response to disasters (whether man-made or not) must also serve to “contain” 
the damage and prevent a spillover effect beyond the “perimeter” of each country and 
into its neighbors. 
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